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Friday, Fcbrnary 10, 16SS. 
CoioStL C. B. nRACKEXIIUnY, R.A. (Director, Artillcry College, 
Woolwich), in thc  Chair. 
THE PRACTICAL VATJUE OF TIIE WAR GAIEE. 
~1 Captain H. Srmsm WILKISSOS, 20th Inncashirc Riflc Volunteers. 
~ 1 1 ~  “ I’russian Military Gazctto” of Jlaizh G, 1824, contnincd n 
pmgr;~1iIi wliicli iiiny Lc i*cndcrcd in Euglisli sorncwlint ns follows :- 
‘6 Tlic nttcmpt, ]ins often bccn mndc to rcprcscnt iii a mnnncr a t  onco 
jnstmctirc and amusing thc olicratioiis of war. Thesc attcmpts.liavc 
been known by tlic iininc of IVar Game. Tlicrc has always Iecii a 
llifficulty in pncticnlly working out tliis coiiccption, and tlicrc has 
l.clnniiietl a very grcat diffcrciico Lctwccn tho scrionsncss of war and 
tllc frivolity of R p m c .  It i3 worthy of rcmnrk that hitlicrto rionc 
hut nicn wlio wcrc not soldicrs limo occnpicd thcrnsclvcs with this 
discovery, and thnt thcrcforo by tlicir impcrfcct picturc of wnr, niid 
tlicir still morc itriperfect imitation of it, t h y  could ncvcr satisfy tlic 
qu i reu ien ts  of tliorouflily trained Ofiiccrs. A t  lcngtli a n  Olliccr 
has dcvotcd hilnsclf duririg :i scrics of years, with nttcution, judgment, 
and pcrscvcrancc, to the pursnit of this object, and lins so far cxtcndcd 
what Iiad bccn begun by his fntlicr, Councillor ron Rciszwitz, that  
war is now rcprcscutcd in a sirnplu and lifc-liko ninnner. Wliocvcp 
uudcrstands iu a11 its bmnclics tlic conduct of war, caii nndcrtako 
witliout Imitation to takc thc part of commandcr of a lnrgci. o r  smnllcr 
body of troops in tliis gamc, crcn if 110 knows nothing of tlio game 
and lins ncvcr seen it played. If i t  is worked out on good plans of 
ma1 ground, oftcn clinngcd so ns bj- a series of firsli dispositions tp  
girc moro variety, tlic gnmc bccomcs still morc instructive. 
“ I slinll gladly hclp with nll tlio mcnns at my clisposnl to incrcnsc 
tlic nunibcr of existing sliccts. 
“If First Licutcnant von Rciszwitz lins found an agrccallc rcwnrd 
for liis cscrtions in thc npprovnl of the  Princcs of tlic Royal lhmilj-, 
of thc Xinistcr of Bar,  :irid of tlic supcrior Officcis who liavc Lccouio 
wquaiiitcd with his p m c ,  hc  will, wlicn it hcoiiics known and 
gclleidly used, assuredly carn tho tlianks of thc Army.” . 
This flnttciiiig notico borc tho signaturcof no lcss a pcrsonngc tliai: 
Voii NuNing, nt tha t  timc Chicf of thc Gcncral Staff, mid it WIS soon 
aftcrtvnmls followcd by n Royal Order, instructing all regiments to 
provide thcmelvcs with tlio Kriegsspicl apparatus, at  thc cspcr:sc of 
tllc Uudgct. Tlic Kriegsspicl wns thus introduced under tlic mosi 
fnrourablo auspices into thc Prussinn Army, whcrc i t  flonrishcd with 
varying fortuncs during thc following forty ycars of pcacc. Tlic sjstciiis 
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70 TRE PILWTICAL YALUE OF THE IVAR G I J I E  
folloircd dnring this first period of tlic history of tlic gamc sccm to 
all haw bccn of tlic snnio mcchnniml type. Tlic cnrlicr test-books 
arc mrc, niid I hnvc ncwr bccn ablo to scc thosc of Reiszwitz, Dccker, 
or Witzlcbcn. l l n t  tlic trnditions of Rciszn-itz and of tliu scliool 
which lic foundcd m n j  bo looked for in thc U c r h  “ k‘riCgG5piClCr 
Vcrcin,” which publishcd in 1842 n tcxt-look with tlic S ~ M O  titlo as 
that of llciszwitz, ‘I Guidc to thc Rcprcscntntion of Jlilitnry 3lnnccn- 
YTCS b ~ .  means of tho Wnr Gamc Apparatus.” Bcforo tho war of 
1870 two othcr schools or socictics, thnt of Uppcr Silcsia nnd thnt of 
Jlngdcburg, had prodnccd similar test-books. Tlic Silcsian school is 
rcprescntcd by Tscliiscliwitz’s ‘* Gnidc to thc War Gamc,” thc >lag- 
dcburg Socicty br T r o t h ,  wlio copies thc tiaditional titlc. 
All tlicso looks bcnr trnccs of tho origin of tlic Kricgsspicl as o 
gnmc, thc clinnctcristics bcirig that n scrics of convcntional rulcs arc 
laid dowri, to bc observed in all cases without csccption. Thus in 
all thcso cnrly systems M-C find tho pqmo cnrricd on b~ “ movcs,” arid 
crcry CRSO of collisioxi is scttlcd by tlic a plicntion of dcfiuitc fixed 
liminnry fmctiou. Tlicn you look undcr certain lists of conditions, 
and find tabulated oppositc to tliosc applicnblc to tliu particular case 
somc similar fractions. Thcsc fiactions compoundccl togctlicr rcsult 
in a ratio by which so many faces of a dic arc nssigncd to ono com- 
batant, and so many to tlic otlicr. Thc dic is tlirown, and according 
to tho colonr of thc facc that comes up onc sidc rcccircs tlio dcnomi- 
nation Rcpiilscd, Dcfcntcd, or Totally Dcfcntcd, v-liicli ~ ~ e n n s  tliot 
tho picccs in qncstion arc turucd upsidc down nnd coxisidcrcd moro 
or lcss out of thc gnmo for two, four, or cight mows, ns tlic cnso may 
bc. hriotlicr tnblc cnnblcs thc curious, by thc snmc throw of tho die, 
to nscertain tho losscs in5ictad on both sidcs by p n ,  rifle, or sabrc. 
Thus in all thcsc codes of rulcs thc dio occnpicd a rcry prominent 
plncc, whilo tlic losscs cmscd by infantry firc, though rnrions plans 
of roughly rsccrtnining niicl noting tlicm nro crplained, haw,  no 
prncticnl cffcct upon the conduct of. tlio operations, cxccpt in so fnr 
as thcy diminish in subscqncnt actions thc number of troops cnpncd. 
This pcculinpity was copied in tho linndbooks thnt first nppcnrca in 
England, both of thcm clntcd 1872, and onc of tlicmbcing in snbitancc 
thc rulcs of Tschisclinitz, tho othcr ttosc of ‘l’rotlin. 
Aftcr thc Frnnco-Gcrmnri war tlic Kricgsspicl bcgan to t o  tnkcn up 
in Gcrmony with frcsh intcrcst. I ts  position in 1674is fully csplaincd 
in a correspondcnco tl int  nppcarcd in that p a r  in tlic ‘‘ Allgcmcinc 
Militsr-Zcitung,” L profcssionnl ~inpcr publislicd at Darmstaclt. Firo 
Swiss Ficld Oficcrs wrotc to tho Editor, asking nbout thc Wnr Gnmo 
in Gcrmany, a scrics of qucstions to which answcrs, written 1 ) ~  a 
German Ofiiccr, a pupil of Schcrfh, wcrc published. 
It sccms, nccording to tlic c d c n c o  thus fortlicoming, that aftcr 
thc n-ar of 1866 tlio War Gamc hnd fallcn someivlint into disrcputc. 
Thc rulcs of Trothn and Tschischwitz wcrc fclt to bc too unlike thc 
rcditics tlint had bccn sccn on tho Bohcmian bnttlc-ficlds. Thosc who 
continued to cultivate tho Kricgsspicl abnndoncd tLc nttcmpt to work 
out combats by its aid, treating it mcrclly as a valunblc cserciso in 
rulcs. You calculnto tlic numhcrs of cac T i sidc, and tlins get n pro- 
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THE PRACTIOAL VALUE OF THE IVAR GA3IE. i l  
rending and t h e  composition of ordcrs, o r  t h y  ccnscd nItogctI1c1- 
U l R P  to treat i t  ns a. gamc, droppcd tho rub, tlic dicc, and  tho tnblcs of 
losses, n11d considcrcd i t  as n rnniimuvro csccutcd unclcr tlic cyc of a11 
nmpirc, b u t  with imagixinry troop3 rcprcscntcd bj- tlic picccs, ant1 
ritll tllc mnp instcad of tlio country. Tiic cstcnt  of thc  clinngc wliicli 
this implies is grcntcr tlinn n p p ~ n r j  at  first sight. 1x1 tlio old gaiiic 
t.llere was rcnlly no umpire. Thc dccisions wcrc m:do bj- tlic rglcs, 
tile tnblcs, nnd t h c  dic, nnd thc  pcrsori who npplicd tlicni (callcd i n  
Berlin and Xcissc tlic ‘I Confidant,” nntl iii Alnylcburg tlic ‘I Trnpnrtinl 
m f c r c c  ’ I )  was nccessnry only to make it possiblc for cncli pnrty t o  
i o v c  IvitIiout thc 0 t h  knowing nll t h n t  Iic \vns doing. On thc  old 
+em, the ~ ‘ B N C ,  wi th  i t s  rulcs, niid tnblcs, arid dice, any OIliccr who 
bob: tho troublo to  gc t  iip tho rulcs could nct ns Confidant or Rcfcrcc. 
B a t  when tlic gnmc nnd al l  its rulcs wcrc gonc, niid instcnd tlicrc was 
manrnurrc 011 the  inap, nothing could be donc without nn umpire. 
KO oficcr  likcs his command to  bc piit ou t  of actioii, unlcss by sorno 
iii \vlioic jndgnicnt Lc has so much coiifirlcxicc ns to bclicvo tlint 
i t  ,+-auld be ridiculous t o  dispute it. Accordinglj- it was found t h a t  
Officers did not’join in  xiinp mnnmiirrcs unlcss thc unipirc \nis sonio 
Rcognizcd tactical nntlioi-itj-. \Vo arc told, thcii, t h a t  wlicri tho  
K&gsspicl bcgnn t o  flourish n p i u  ciftcr tlic Fixnco-Gcrmnii war, thc 
rules of Tschiscliwitz nnd T r o t h  hnd cntircly gonc out  of fnsliion, 
slid thc frco s js tcni  of umpir ing lind como in. Tlic War Gniiic lind 
gircn way t o  tho ni”p mniiacuvrc, axid tlio frco sj-stem was plxctiscd 
by all thc famous uriipires of t h a t  time,--\‘crdy du Vcrnois nnd his 
pupil JIcckcl, Schcrff; nnd  Uronsnrt YOU Sclicllcndorf. n u t  ~vlicro 
tlicrc was n o  famous umpirc  tho wholo prnctico b g a n  t o  drop oiit of 
fnsliim. Tho nttcmpt wns tlicxi trictl to  rlevisc n mcthod which should 
miko thc gamo prncticnblc cvcn wLcn tlicrb ~ i a s  no unipiro of estnb- 
lishcd rcputc t o  bc Lad. 
Thc beginning of this new dcparturc, tlic first nttcnipt to  cspound 
a sjs tcm which whilc nbandoning tlic old rulcs shoiild yc t  bc an 
inetrnmcnt fit for  tho iisc of t h c  ordinary OIliccr, wns irindo i n  n 
p m p h l c t  called I‘ Studics on tlic W n r  Gnmc,” publislicd i n  1873. 
Tlic nutlioi. of t h c  Stndics wns a Profcssor at  tlic IIanorcr Kricgs- 
schulc, Licutcnnnt hlcckcl, who publishcd n fcw ycars lntcr wlicri n . 
Major on thc  Gcncrnl Staff n r c l y  important trcntisu on Tactics. 
Tlic Stndics consist snbstniitinlly of two CSSRJS, of which t h c  first, on 
thc advantngcs t o  bc Jcr i rcd  from thc  p n c t i c c  of tho Wnr Gnrnc, tlic 
second a criticism of t h c  old rulcs as rcprcscntctl by T r o t h  a n d  
Tscliischwitz. Alcckcl’s vicu- w a s  t h n t  iunsmuch as tlic dccisivc 
elemcnt i n  modern bnttlcs is  tlic cffcct produccrl by fircnrrns, t h a t  
effcct ought i n  d l  cnscs iu  tho W:ir Gnmc t o  t c  t k c  basis of t h c  
umpirc’s dccision. Ho slioiicd t h a t  t h c  old rulcs, though t h y  gavc 
hblcs  for  calculating losscs cnuscd by firc, prncticnllj- dccidcd al l  
eugngcmcnta without rcfcrcncc t o  tlic cffccts of fircnrms, c iccpt  in so 
f R r  as thc  numbcr of mcri shot  diminished thc numbcr o t  combatants. 
He proposcd t o  calculntc cnrcfnllj- Chc Iosscs produccd I)y firc, and  t o  
Wcrtnin by this  incans t h c  pliyysicnl and  morn1 condition of cnch 
body of troops cngngcd. Upon t h c  bnsis of this moral and physical 
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T I E  PBACTICIL VALUE OP TIIE KAR OISIE. C .  r : !  
conditioii of cncli side thc rcsiilt of D collision was to bo dccidcd. 
“ If,” \vrotc Jlcckcl, ‘’ the War Gnmc is to giro D iiaturnl niid instruc- 
tive rcpiduction of modern fighting, tho grc:it pocvcr of tlic cffccts 
of firearms must bo nssigncd tho snmc Icnding part upon tlic map 
whicli it, plnys upon thc battlc-field. Tlic c1iniicc.r of battle dcpciid 
i~o\vntInj.s mainly upon firc cflccts. In tho combat of in fan t r j  ngninst 
infantry it is impossible to detcrmixic tlic chanccs of tho opposiiig sides 
uiilcss thc cffccts of tiicir firc nrenccurntcl~dctcrmiiic~. I n  the dccision 
of ct-cry infantry action tho first question must 110: Upon which sido 
is tlic supcriority of firo? W l i n t  firing forcc can tlic dcfcndcr 
develop against thc nttnck? . . . ‘1‘Lc oiily coiiibnt that  docs 
not clepcnti upon tho results of firing is tlint of cavalry a s i n s t  
cavalry. Accordingly u-o must requirc from thc Wnr Gamo first of 
all  tlint it shall givu us thc possibilitly of dctcriiiiiiing at each succcs- 
s i w  stngc of an action thc cffccts produccd by rillc and artillery firc, 
niitl sccoiidly, that i t  shall bnso i ts  decisions upon tlic cffccts of tlic 
firiiig just :is i n  Lnttlo tlic result redly dcpcnds u1>0il tli~iii.” Jlcckcl 
further dcniands tha t  tlic unipirc 01. rcfcrcc slinll “noto in a currciit 
accouiit a11 thc losscs of cacli unit as tlicj- occur, in ordcr to bo ablo 
at  niy. t i i i io  to dctcrminc tlio amount of loss of iiiorctljucfors which 
aiiy unit Lns suffcrcd up to nnjgivcn momcnt. Tliis morn1 wcnkciiing 
coiiplcd with tlic cscrtioiis tlic i i i i i t  lins already nndcrgonc will bc tlic 
clntn froiii which to nsccrtain tbc unit‘s rcinaiuiug liglitiiig encrgy. 
‘l’lic fighting encrgy of tlic scvcial units iiiust be tlic foundation for 
all thc uniliirc’s decisions.” 
?IIcckcl piiblislicd with liis Studics an clahornte tnhlc from whicli 
t o  cstract with t!ic aid of tho dic tlic losscs cnusctl by iiifniitry or 
nrtillcry firc. Hc distinguislicd tlirco kinds of games; tliostrntcgicnl, 
to Lo plnyctl on tlic Gcncrnl Staff maps, from half-an-inch to nn inch 
to tlic milc ; tho grand tactical gamc, in wliicli bodies ns largo as 
divisions should bc n r r a y d  on eitlicr d c ,  iind no dctailcd cnlculn- 
tioii of losscs inndc; niid tlic rcgirnciitnl War Gamc for wliicli 110 
intcndcd his tnl)lc of losscs a i d  liis minutc alculntions. For this 
gnurc Iic proposcd a map on n ratlicr larger scnlc tlinn Itad bccn 
ciistomnrj, &. instcad of =b, or 10 iiiclies instead of 8 iy l ics  
to tlic milc. 
‘l‘lic nppcnrnnco of Ifcckcl’s studics in 1853 iiinrks nn cpocli in 
tho history of thc War Gnmc. Tlio first result nppcais to Itarc 
Lccn tlrnt tlic old slystcrns finally climppearcd. It is truc t l int  i n  
1874 iicw editions Loth of T r o t h  nnd of Tscliisclirvitz nppcnrcd, hut 
tho new editions, tliougli tlicy p v o  ncw tables of losscs, did not giva 
tho cffccts of itifnutry firc any niorc cssciitinl placo in tlic gninc, 
niid nliparciitly t h y  xic-rci. nttaincd to popularity. Tho first Englisli 
0Ilici:il tcst-book \vas pnblislicd bcforo t l iu  Studics nppcnrcd, and \\as 
compiled from II Gcrmnii origiiinl piiblished bcforc tlio war of 1670. 
It was based cntircly ou thc ti-iditional coiiccptioii of a p m c ,  ntid 
bccniiic obsolctc on thc nppcnrniicc of tho Studies. Thc rcviscd Look 
of rulcs pnblishcd i i i  1684 is a coinproinisc. ‘l’nblcs nnd rulcs in thc 
old stylc arc K i w i i ,  with tlic old fault that if tlic rules \vcm folloivcd 
tlic cficct of firearms ivould hava vcrj- littlo iuflucncc ou tlic result; 
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THE I’RACTIC-\L VALUE OF THE KAR GAME. $3 
but tho stitcnicnt is madc that “ Rcfcrcnco to tlic loss tnblcs sliould 
be oroidcd ns much as possiblc, tlic tactical situntion being tlic basis 
of tlic umpire’s decision.” This sccms.to mc to contain nn ndmissioii 
illconsistent nitli any high cstimntc of tlic vnluc of tlic book i i i  whicli 
i t  appmrs. Thus tho Ihglish manuals of thc War Gnmc bclong i i i  
rnluc if not in dntc to tho epoch bcforc tlic publication of 31cckcl’s 
Stu(Iic5. I n  Gcrrnnny thcrc lins bccn sincc thcu somc progrcss in 
two directions. I n  1675 Jlcckcl piiblislicd thc first portion of a 
p i d o  tc tlic gamc, calling i t  “ Uircctivcs for tlic 7Var Gnmc.” He 
n new sct  of tnblcs for mlculnting tlic losses by firc ; introrliiccd 
t c rc~~a l  iuiprovcincnts into thc apparatus, nncl publislicti a map on thc 
scnlu of 
Iu 1856 wns publislicd Gcncml Vcrdy’s “ ICssay on tlic IVnr Gnmc,” 
tllc dctailcd dcscription of R garric ~ o r l r c d  out froin Iicginniiig to cud. 
Tliis is tlic classicid cnamplc of whnt I linve called tlic frcc method of 
nIllpirilig, ant1 is I supposo ouc O E  tho best kiio\vn of inilitarj* books. 
111 1877 nppcarcd an cssay callcci the ‘‘ Rcgiriicntnl Wnr Gniiic,” by 
1,icutcnnnt Xiiumnnn of tho Snson Riflcs. Licutcriaut Kaiimnnii’s 
object I ~ S ,  31~ckclb had ~ C C I I ,  to producc 3 systciii cnpablc of 
c i q k p i c i i t  in societics whcrc tlicrc was 1 1 0  fatilous unipirc, no 
1)crson cE unquestioncd nuthority upon tactical matters. H c  ntloptcd 
from JIcckcl thc scdc of &= for liis map (wLic11, liowcwr, rcprc- 
sciits :ictiial countrj-) nod tlic two Icadiiig itliw, viz., ciircful cnlculn. 
tiwi of tlic clfccts of fire, and dctcrrninntion of tlic issuo of cvcrj- 
Rctiori u p r i  tlic basis of thosc cff’ccts. LIc nlso tricrl to nsccrf:iiii, com- 
pnriiix a numbor OE rcgimcntal Iiistorics, tlic :rvcm,nc number of hits 
Olitaiiicd n t  cadi of thc dill‘crciit rnngcs, which lie cstimntcs :it about 
5 pcr ccnt. of thc nvcmge numbcr of hits madc a t  tlic s:iniu ranges in 
peace p c t i c c .  This scrics of figures, workcd out for n 1’russi:iii siib- 
division of n company (Zzq), Iic transfcrrcd to n scalc, placing tlio 
figurcs in, four rows nccoiding to tlic closer or inorc opcii forriintioii of 
tlic cncniy fircd :it, nnd plnciiig cncli sct  of f ip rc s  a t  a distnncc cor- 
rcslioiidiiig to thc mngc  from tlic initinl cnd of thc scale. l’hc scale 
so iiintlc \\’as of 3 pcculinrly casr and rcadb- Iiclp to nu unipirc in thc 
ciilculation of iosscs, for it siipplica him n t  oncc, for crcry niiigc, with . 
wlint iiiny bc cnllcd tlic normal nvcrnga number of hits to 1io cxpcctcd 
iii action. This figiirc is tlicn n snfc datum wliicli Iic can modif-y 
accordiiig to his vicw of the spccinl caw. Xauriinnn also gave miicli 
attcntioii to tlic qucstioii of how tho “ rcmniuirig fighting cncrgy ” 
of niiy body of troops is affected bj tlic losscs inflicted iipon it. . A 
rompmy. Iic .rap, can loso 15 pcr ccnt.. of it3 IUCII without flincliing. 
It must bc considcrcd ns much slmkcn nftcr losiiig from 25 to 36 per 
cciit. :iccordiug to circunistniiccs, and will bc nltogctlicr pu t  of action 
by a loss of 50 pcr ccnt. Tho d:itn thus 6ircii bj- Cnptaiii Knuniniiri 
to  assist iii tlic dctcriqi1i:ition of thc effects of firc and in tLc nl$icn- 
ti011 ( I f  those Cffccts to the decision of combats arc of immcnsc pmctical 
iisc to : in  uiiipirc .whn is not a n  nutlioritj. Tlicy wcrc n priccloss 
Loon to tlic 31:inchcstcr Tactical Socicty in tlic pncticc of i ts  carlicr 
yews, wlieu i t  would l i n ~ e  bccii nlniost im~mossiblc to unipirc without 
tLc usc of “ Knuu~:iuu’s scalc.” Appnrcii t l~ t h y  linrc bccn fouiid 
of nn imqinnry piccc of country. 
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75 THE PnhCTICAL VXLUE OF TIE \\;\XI G.\JIE. 
nscful also in other qnnrtcrs, for I scc tliat Coloncl Bilinick, the 
careful historian of the Slivriitza campaign, in liis cshaustirc essay 
on tho conduct of tho Wnr Gamc, ndopts en hloc both tho scale of 
losses nnd the cdculntion as to thcir moral cffeds. 
With tho publication in 1881 of Nnumnnn’s sccond edition, tho 
do~clopmcnt of tho War Gnmo in Germany semis to linrc attaincd 
for the prcsent to complction, nnd moro recent progrccss ]ins bccn in IL 
slightly diffcrcnt direction, to which I proposo shortly to call your 
attention. 
l3eforc Icaving thc historical pnrt of n i j  subjcct, 1 mny pcrhnps 
vcntnro to rcmind sou of tlio latest official mcution of tho Wnr Gnmo 
in thc land of its birth. Tlic “Ordci* of Scrricc in tlic Ficld,” 
pnblishcd last j c n r  as o. substituto for the “Rcgolations” which Lad 
so long bccn familiar, lins prefixcci to it an “Introduction,” in which 
tho purposes of n soldier’s training and tlio principles wliicli sliould 
p i d o  it nro briefly sct forth. It is nlinost aplioristic in its concise 
cIcarncss, bcginning with tlic pmctiml statement tlint pcacc training 
must bo rcgulatcd solcly by tlic rcqnircnients of war. ‘l’his introduc- 
tion, aiming a t  cutting clown training to csscntials, enumerates the 
aids to training which can be givcxi br tlicorr. First in tlic list comes 
thc War Game, of which tho writers ~ n y :  Thc War Game, roidcr. 
ski l jd  guidnncc, will givc plentiful occasion for thc study of our 
regulations, of tactical principles and facts, nnd will cilso offer tho 
op rtnnity of rapidly formin 9 dccisioiis. 
bcforc yon of silty years of tho 7Vm Gnmc in Gcrnian~-, \YO find 
that tho attcmpt to conduct thc prncticc as n gnmc by tlic nid of a sct 
of rigid riilcs brokc down with thc arrival of niodcrri fircarins on thc 
battlc-Gcld. Tho only War Gnmu now found to bo pncticablc is a 
~nnnmuvro on the map conducted by nn uiiipirc; but tho nmpirc is 
obligcd to bnso his decisions upon tho actual facts of modern fighting, 
and wlierc in this rcspcct his porsonnl authority, his o m  contidcncc, 
or the confidence of his comrcrdcs in liis judgment ,is insuficicnt, i t  
has bccn found desirablc to snppl1 him, not with rules, xhicli arc im- 
possible, but with aids towards tho formation of a decision. Tho 
tcndcncy lias h e n  for tho regimental W n r  Gamc to incirasc thc’scalc 
of tlic map and trio minutcncss with which thc dctnils nro worked out, 
whilo nt tho 6amc timc rlicrc nn umpire of extended kno\vlcdgc and 
maturc jud,meiit was arnilnblc, thc coinbnt of largo bodies has bccn 
pnctiscd, nnd tho nmpirc lias bccn cspcctcd to summarize in his own 
mind thc othcrwisc tedious process of dcciding tlic issuc. 
In thc stndics to wliicli I hnro so often referred of 3hjor 3Icckcl 
is nu essay on tho import:tricc of tho IVar Gnmo for tho intellcctunl 
training of tho Ofliccr in tho ar t  of command. Tlicre is nuthciitic 
cvidcncc that thc views in this cssq- rcprcscntcd a t  tho titnc tlic 
opinions current among tlic leaders of German military litcxtturc, in 
particular thosc of Vcrdy du Vernois and Schcrff. Tho object is,” 
sajs Mcckel, “ to afford to tho rcb6mcntal OEccr who is so cntirclj 
absorbed by tho practical duties of his profession thc opportunity of 
training himsclf for his duty as a commandcr of troops in battlc. 
Kcricwiug tho principal p ti cnomcna whic~i I havo tried to place 
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T I E  PRACTICAL \‘ALUE OP THE \YAR GAJIE. 73 
snch an opportunity is gircii him witliout too grcnt a cost of timo or 
trouble by thc prncticc of thinking o w r  and solving militnrj- proIiIcms 
in llis mind. Tho only Incaiis, and  R very csccllcnt incnns, of attain- 
ing tllis cnd is tlic War Gnine.” Mcckel is rcry nnsioiis to nrgc tho 
pcculinr cnliie of tlio Tar Gamc, for tho  c o m p i y  or ficld Officcr. no 
n list of scvcn adrantagcs which hc nllcges :ire dcrivcd from thc  
Tho War Gamo hc says, assists tho Officcr to rcnlizc for 
himself thc gcncral nature of tlioopcrntions of war; it nffords constant 
practice in tlic composition of orders as wcll ns in tlicir intcrprctntion, 
and i n  thc peculiar form of clisciplinc which consists in subordinating 
1lis own opinion to that of his snpcrior. Tlic War Gnnic is a per- 
p t u a l  study of ground; it ncccssitatcs an cndcss scrics of tactical 
and rcsolves ; it is continnally tcnching principles by 
their application in  concrctc cnscs, and is :rl~-ays, to thoso who nro 
intcrcstcd iu it, nil i~icitcment o frcsh study. Thcso semn thcscs 
~ c c k c l  dcvclops nnd defcnds thou@ scrcntccn pngscs, and coucludcs 
that ‘‘ tho Wnr Gamc is .dcstincd in tlic future to bccomc om of thc 
most inqiortant mcnns of training tlio combatant Otliccr.” You will, 
I am sure, p c f c r  to Lc s p n r d  the rchcarsal of scvcntecn pngcs in  
pmisc of tho War Gnmc; but I will wnturc  to undcrlino onc or two 
of tllc admntngcs clnimcd. 
In tlic first placc, cisIto thc coniposition and intcrprctnticn of ordcrs. 
Almost crcq- test-book of tactics rcads tlic student ;L lccturc 011 tlic 
imprtanco of clcarncss, conciscncss, tho riglit armngcrnciit in thc 
framing of orders, and tho maxim is laid donm that i f  an ordcr is 
capable of being misnndcrstood, it will infallibly Lo misunderstood. 
Tlic roluntcer Officcr ncmr  has any opportnnity whatcvcr of either 
corn osing or intcrprctingorders such 11s kc might bc conccrncd with 
nerer receircs onc srllablc of instruction on thc subject. For this 
reason I nm disposed to nttnch n pecnlinr, possibly nn cxng,ncntcd 
importance, to tlic form of those orders in  tho War Gnmc which alono 
are usunlly dclibcratcly proparcd-thoso cmannting bcforo tlic actual 
game &gins citlicr from tho nmpirc or from tho combatants, and to 
the form of all written mcssnges. In  particular, it is dcsirnblo to 
avoid such ordcn ns dcpcnd npon fntnro contingcncics, at lcnst if tho 
authority giving tlic order cxpccts himself to rcrnnin with tlic troops 
that rccciw it. 
Tlic rnluo of tho War Game ns n study of ground and ns n study of 
map-rcading clcpcnds of couwo npon tho rnluo of tho map. Upon 
this point, thrcc principles have nlwnys foicibly prcscntcd thcm- 
selrcs to my mind, which I vcnturc to lay bcforc you f o r  wlint thcy 
are wortli. I tliink the map uscd should invnrinbly bc n map of rcal 
country, if possiblcit sliould represent ground ?cccssiblc to thc Oficcrs 
Rho uso it, and i t  should rcprcxnt all tkoso fcaturcs which Larc any 
tactical iniportance. A diffcrcncc of. lorcl amonnting to 13 or  15 fcct 
is amply suficient to corccal tlio movcmonts of any body of troops, 
arid tlicrcforc no mnp can, as it sccms to mc, be ndcquatc for tho 
p n r ~ s c s  of tlio rcgimcntnl War Gamc unlcss i t  rcprcscnts snch 
diffcrcnces. The Gcrmnn map of Rouiggritz givcs contour lincs nt 
in t E c ficld. AIurcowr, in thc ordiuarj  conxso of his tniniiig, hc 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:0
3 1
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
i G  TIiE PRACTICAL YALUE OF TIIF. W-\R GAME. 
intcrrnls of 124 fect, tlic mnps of tho bnttlc-ficlds of 1670 a t  iiitcrvnls 
of j nictrcs, tlic ncw \Var Gamc map of Schwcidnitz, pullislied by 
t he  Prussinn Stnfl‘, lins contours n t  tho same intcrvnl, bu t  tho English 
mnp hns no coiitours xicarer tlinii 50 fect froiii one nnotlier.1 I 
CnnnoL liclp thinking tbnt n grcnt boon would bc confcrrcd, n t  a n 1  
zntc upon voliintccr Officers, vcr fcw of whom linvc tlic opportunity 
of m:ikiug tlicmsclv-os ncqunintci witli thc country roun(1 LiIdcrsLot, 
if tlic authorities i ~ e r o  to provido ni:ip of tho nciglibourliood of tho 
principal volunteer centres, giving R sutricicnt numbcr of contour lincs. 
Tlic old G-iiicli xiinp~, idicrc tlicy exist, might rcndily 1m coinplctcd in  
this way by Oficcrs for thcir own use. In tlic l\l;inclicstor Tncticnl 
Society !&inch mnps, filled in with freqiicnt contoui-s, 1lnv-o long bccii 
uscd !or R minor IVnr Gnmc, and Coloncl Asplniid, who took u 011 
liiiiisclf the labour of survcging mid diawing in thcso contours, r ins 
nssiired iiic tliaL 110 found tlic work of tlio grcntcst bciicfit to liimsclf. 
1 nni perfectly ccrtnin tbnt very fcw rohnteer oficcrs h r c  nny idea 
of tlic nnioiiiit of iiifornintioii wliicli can bc cxtr.ictcd from R i i inp 
contoured n t  short intervals, nnd I kiioiv, from cxpcricnccn, that iiotliiiig 
more opens thc C J C S  npon this point than tho usc of sucli n map for 
tlic \Vai* G:iuic, coiiplcd with sucli aids to  its iiitcrpctntioii ns  
Kauiiinnii’s “ Incnsurc of \-isibility.” Whilc on tlic subject of tlic 
nppnr:itus I may ve~diirc nlso to suggcst that tlic cost of tlic pieccs :it 
prcscnt supplied by tlic Govcrnincrit might bc considcrnbly reduced 
by rcducing tlicir xiurnbcr. Tliu ordirinrr rcgiiucntal galno docs riot 
reqnirc iiiorc tlinn n few picccs for cncli d c  ; why aLould tlic regi- 
mciit 1)c coiiipcllcd to bur two Xriiiy Corps ? 
TLc principal ndvnntnge, hoivcvcr, wliicli is clnimcd f u r  tlic Kar 
G:iiiic is thc pizctico whicli i t  g i w s  thc Oficcr in dccidiug what 110 
ought to do in n gircn situation. It is not cnoiigli for tho Ofijccr, 
wlicii lic fiiids liimsclf in the field, t l in t  lie shonlil l i ~ v c  his Iicnd ful l  
of what is c:illed “vnlunblc information;” lic hns to iiialic up his 
riiiiid wliat orclcrs Iio will give, nnd tl iu niorc Iic runs through in his 
llentl tlic doctriiics Inid dowii in tcxt-l)ooks 011 tactics, thc murc Iic 
will find Iiimsclf cmbarrnsscd. Thc pnrticnlnr case in wliicli lic finds 
himsclf n l w a ~ s  coincs undcr onc of half-n-dozcn nppnrcritly contrn- 
dictory mnsinis; wliicli is Iic to follow ? X o  test-book nud no effort 
of mcmory cnn decido for hiin, but R sufiicicut nrnotitit of practice in  
tlic \Vnr GRIIIC will make tlic clccisioii eompamti~-clj- cnsy. Ih-cn 
militnrr history, vnlunblc ns it is if  rightly used, will not prcparc tho 
Ofliccr for wnr unless lic I J ~ S  laiimcd to apply it. It is not, liowcvcr, 
nicrcly the liabit of dcciding what can bc lcnrncd froni the War 
Gnriic. Tlicrc is no grcntcr sourcc of dificulty to tlic cornmnndcr in 
\vnr tlinii tlic unccrtnirity iii wliich lic must d~i-ays find liinisclf ns 
to tlic enemy’s morcmcnts :tiid iiitcntions. Accordiiig to Gcncml 
Slicriiinu, the most rcmnrknblc quality of Gcncml Gixnt was t h t  
“ hc was iicvci* scared by wlint  thc cncmy might Lc doiiig Lcjoiid his 
sight. I Ic  g,~\-c his bcst attcritioii to Icarniug t h e  position, strciigtli, 
.\ rcry intrrcstiiig illustrntion of tlic p e a t  iiiiportancc ittaclicd in Gcruinr to 
wcii iiiiiiutc clitTcrciiccsnf Icrcl xi11 bc foiind in thc introduction to tLc tkircl (187.1) 
cdition of Troth’s ~ainplilct on t1:c N’nr Qomc. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 Su
sse
x L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:0
3 1
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
15
 
THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF TUE WAR cum. 77 
 all(^ probable plans of his nilvcrarj-, mid tlicri mndo liis 0 ~ x 1  plnns as 
best Iic might to foil or orcrtlirow him, modifjing or chaiiging 
them oiily after it.bccamc clcarlx ncccssury to do so; but never lying 
awnkc of nights tr j ing to makc plans for thc cucmy as well as fol- 
himself.” ‘l‘lic quality thus dcscribcd, thongh natural to Grant and 
l ~ l ~ n l ~ l y  to nll great commnndcrs, mny yct l o  ncquircd by cultivation. 
rcriicinbci. somc years ngo asking R friciid of iny own, wlio shared 
my high opixiinii of thc rnlnc of tho W n r  Gnnic, whnt he thought wns 
tllc innst important lcssou lcnrncd from tha t  pncticc, “ You Icnrn,” 
hc q l i c d ,  .‘ not to get fliirricd orcr \\-lint tlic othcr man i s  doing.” 
Tlic cxnct csprcssion by d i i c l i  1 can bcst convoy to you my belief 
to tlio vnliic of thc War Gnmc is 6UppliCd to mo by a pcculinr 
coincidcncc. I was rcnding lntcly n rcry raluablc cssny by n h j o r  
(now Coloiicl) -ion Gizycki, of tho  Hnnoverinn Ficld Artillcty Iiegi- 
mcnt, on tlic p c t i c a l  usc of military history. A t  tlio very bcginniug 
ho puts his fingcr on \dint  is gciicridly thc weak point. ‘‘ l los t  nicn,” 
110 says, “ sot out to scck knowlcdgc only and not judgmcxit.” Sincc 
that T T ~ S  written iu 18S1 Coloncl -ion Gizjcki hns donc a p a t  dcnl of 
lvork contributing townrds giring military studics thcir truc dircc- 
tion; aud ns I wits preparing this lccturc I rcccivcd n Icttci. froin a 
very distinguishcd English Oficcr, commcnding Colonel Gigcki‘s 
work ns constituting “ tho rcry bcst kind of instruction-that which 
trains judgmcnt nnd not knowlcdgo only.” Tho ideal wliicli tlie 
Gerrnnri writer has thus sct bcforc himself, and according to a conipc- 
tent English jiidgo lins nttniiicd, exactly corresponds to thc cffcct of the 
War Gnmc if carricd on ixi tlio riglit spirit. nut tlio spirit is cvcrj- 
thing, and of tlic War Gnmc ns of ncarly cvcry otlicr activity i t  may 
be said that n inan briiigs awny from it what hc tnkes to it. Thu 
Officcr who is iinxious to  Icarn tho scwct of tbc n r t  of command-of 
8‘ troop-lending," to  nso tlio modcrn Lnrbnrism-may lcnrn n great 
den1 from tho War Gnmc. B u t  I bclicrc it is ncccssary that hc 
should como to thc gum duly prepnrcd. Tlic plnjers reqnirc, of 
coiirsc, R knowlcdgc of tho functions nnd mcthod of tlic cruploymcnt 
of t!io tlircc aims arid of tho principal formntioiis of tlicir drill r c p -  
lations. Tlicy must also be nblo to read tlic mnp. This is tlio iiiclis- 
pcnsablo rninimiim rcquircd from crcry plnycr. But crcn this is 
capb lc  of scwml  intcrprctations. Very little is rcnlly lcnrncd b j  
tho pcrnsnl of a test-book. Tlic most satisfactory mctliocl of gctting 
Rn insight into tho iintiirc of battlc i s  by the close study of sonic par- 
ticular bnttlc, wliicli must bo tnkcn from rcccnt histor7 lcst its lcssons 
should 110 longcr bc up to dntc, and sliould be studicd in tlio most 
dctailctl nccourit that ~1111 bo obtained, and with tlic nid of tLc bcst 
possiblc mnp. The very bcst mcthod is to go to thc batllc-field with 
map and liistorj in linnd. A sccond useful study, cqu:illy ncccssary 
to tlic rcnl npprcciation of thc  mcthods of handling troops, is to rcad 
BOMC of tho controversy upon tlio subjcct which was cscited by tho 
Pranco-German Wnr. Tho German Officcr tnkes liis Field Escrcisc and 
his Regulaiioxis fox. Ficld Scrricc, and  finds in thcm tlic siftcd deposit 
of thc tactical cxpcrienco of nll inodcrn war. Tlicj arc R pcrpctnnl 
ziiidc to him in all his studies, h c ; n ~ s c  tho bcst intclligcuco of thc  
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78 TlIE PRhCTIChL VALUE OF THE KAR QIIIE.  
Gcrman Ariiiy is cmploycd in kccping tlicrii up to thc lcrcl of tho 
time. Tlio Englisli Officcr ]ins no such guidc. and accordingly if he 
rcdly wants to  undcrstnnd is drivcn to go bchind tlio Rcgtilations aiid 
to study tho coiitrorcrsial litcrature. n u t  this study, if  carricd on in  
thc spirit tlint sccks not to find fault bnt to undcrstnnd, is prolnbly 
tho bcst commcntnry on’xnilitary history, aud onc of the bcst aids, if not 
tho best, towards tho formation of o tactical judgment. In propor- 
tion as thc student accnmnlntcs tho materials upon wliicli his judg- 
mcnt c:in bc bnscd, 110 should try to find opportunities of cscrcising it 
i n  concrctc cnscs. Tlio Wac Gamo is only onc form of such cscrciso. 
A sccond, and n rery profitablc onc, consists in thc working out of 
tactical cserciscs without troops upon the nctunl groiind whcrc they 
arc siipposcd to Iinppcu. A third is to hc found in tho solution of 
tactical problcms on n mop without picccs OP opponcuts, and may 
well bo joincd witli thc stiidy of military history. This is tlic pixc- 
ticc which iu Germany now is most closcly associatcd with tho Wnr 
Game. 
These, as it scenis to mc, nro thc studies out of diicli  tlio practice 
of thcIVaor Gnnie should nrisc, arid up to Khich in turn it sliould lcad, 
tlio prcliminary studies to bc pursued by all who may wish to become 
umpircs. It is no longer possible to draw up rulcs by which thc 
pmctico can be guided, and tho pL?ycrs nro tliercforu now ciitircly 
dcpendcnt on tho umpire’s judgment. I am uiiablo to-scc that thc 
ncccssarr iasiglit into tho xinturc of war can bo oltaincd by any 
sirnplcr menus tlinn tliosc I lin-io tlcscribcd. 
But all this troublo would not I c  wortli taking if tlic only rcsult 
wcrc tliat it niadc thc Oficcr a capablc umpire n t  tho W a r  Gnmc. It 
seems to mi: worth takiug for anotlicr rcason, that it is, so far as I 
can judge, tlic only way by which n voluntccr Officcr can trniu himself 
to Lo n lcndcr of men. Such n rcsnlt, tho conrcrsion of voluntccr 
Officers into rcal Icadcis, nppcnrs to xnc nn objcct of national import- 
nncc, niid likely if i t  is ncliiorcd to be fmuglit with bencficinl cons.. 
qucnccs tho cstcnt of which no man can measnrc. Tho timo wlien 
Toluntccr Oficcrs wcro plnjing nt soldiers is prctty ncnrly ovcr, nnd 
most of tlicm arc now nilling to tnkc pains to bccomc Oficcrs in fact 
3 s  well as in name. Iht  t h y  do not want to run after n will-o’-thc- 
wisp; nnd it is not good that they slionld frittcr away time in unpro- 
fitable discussions or wasto tlicir cncrgics in tho pursuit of crotclxcts. 
Tlicy look for uidancc from tlic leaders of profcssionnl o inion. 
‘l’licy want tlic firection iudicoting 11y some ncknowlcdgcd nut K ority. 
BIany of them, howcvcr, aro dctcrrcd from indoor studics by the im- 
pressiori that books, problcms, axid War Gamcs arc not “practical.” 
I n  opposition to that too common opinion I haro put forwnrd a 
diffcrcnt ricw. 3Iy main contcntion has h e n  that tlic War Game, 
carricd on undcr cnpablc gnid:incc, i3 an inmliinblc arid indispcnsnblc 
part of an 0 5 c c t ’ s  training, though its rnluc must nln-ajs depcnd on 
thc capacity and militaq- insight of thc umpire. This conclusion I 
liavc endeavoured to prescnt to you ns the net rcsult of sixty year3 of 
tlic liistory of the gamc in thc Army M-hcrc such studies arc most a t  
liomc. KO doubt crery man’s intcrprctntion of history is dctcrmincd 
’ 
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THE PRAOTICAL VALUE OF TEE WAR GAJIE. 79 
to soma extent by his own cspcricncc, nnd I iiiay confess  that the 
E l l o p  of my skctcli of tho War Game lins bccn rcachcd through (L 
long scrics of fnilurcs. I liaro h l  sornc cxpcriciicc of how not to do 
i t  Ilidccd, ono of tlic great mcrits of tho War Gnmo is tbnt i t  gives 
us t l ic chniicc of making mistnkcs without scrious conscqncnccs 
cxccpt to our own ranitr .  Unt its grcatest mcrit is t l int  it brings 
ofiiccrs togcthcr nnd iiinkcs tlicm no t  only comrades but  fiicnds. 
ijany of tlic happiest hours of my lifc liarc h c n  spent working orcr 
tllc lnap or discussing problcms in tlic ficld with n smnl1,group of 
brother oficcrs. For D nnmbcr of Fears KC have blundcred together 
niid discusscd onr Muiidcrs. Littlc by littlo IFC k n m  mado np our minds 
most of tho qucstions with which ns O5ccrs we lisrc to dcal, so 
tlint tho view of tho Officer’s t r a i n i n g  upon wliicli I now nsk for your 
\-crdict is ncitlicr nntricd nor peculiar to mysclf. It is that of tho 
Jdn~ichcstcr Tactical Socict;y. 
3lajor-Gcncral G.ZT.Moscnr~rF: I nlanje find i t  thcrc lccturcr that tho aooncr 
~ t ~ ~ c b o t l y  has the pluck to stnitd up  and begin, thc sooncr the rcst of thoso nnrious 
to s ak follow his eramplc. As I’rcsident of tlie Tactical nnd War Gamo Society 
in tc homo district, I hnrc the plocleuro of working 3 good dcal a t  tho Wnr Game. 
I pcrfectlp ngco with tho lccturcr that thia nffonls 3 most rduablo training for 
0Lliccr.i. Our socicty in London i n  cnrricd on at  tlie Wcstniinstcr Town l h l l ,  
ahcrc wc incet twico a month during tlic rintcr, and the tnctical excrciso id  
gcticrallj aorLcd by Ollicers of thc Auxiliarj FO~CCI, ~ometinic~ militiu O5cclv 
s aiiiat militia, nnd at other timcs roluntccr O5ccrlr ngninrt roluntccrs. Captain 
$illiikon ha3 nlludcd to composition of odcrs. and I should like to say hcrc, what 
probably no roluntccr or militia Ollicer would like to sny of himsclf, that tho com- 
position of orders which harc Gccn furnished on tlie day of the pro o d  exerciw, 
to tlie ehicf urn in, has bccn this scnwn marrcllously accurate. ! d e j  h a w  bccn 
drawn out in tEo TCV clcarcst way, wry oftcn-dillicult orders to giro out- 
ilioning ininicnse nttcntion nnd wry  great grirsp of tho necessary knowlcdgo on the 
p r t  of tho Oficers of tho Auxiliorj Forces. 1 ccrtninlr do congratulate tlicm, as 
Colonel Halo and otlier umpircs have done, and tlicrc i 3  no doubt that it h a rcrv 
uscful pmctice. wo taro not j c t  got in London Captain I\’numann’s scale, b i t  
certainlj I hope RO ma do LW, a5 it should xnntcriilll~ nsiist u3 in quickcniug the 
game. Tho only dimcufty to my mind in thc whole question is that it doc3 tnko a 
wry long timc, extending somctimcs from fire o’clock, with an intcrrnl, up  to marly 
elcrcn: of course, t h t  ia raking a good drnl of timc, p?rticularl ns m o s t  of u8 ore 
busy during tlie day. The poacr of rcading mnpa is certain& bccominx o mo3t 
uscful nnd rerj aell-derclopd uiattcr in thc  Auxiliary Forces. I shall nercr 
forget inanj jmr3  ago an Olliccr in my o m  rcgirneiit-ire wcro on the march-I 
had nig map, nnd was looking a t  it. I said to him, I wonder where we arc now? ” 
‘ I  oh,” hc raid, “1 do not know; 1 nercr could rcnd R Inap in my life.” Well, bc  
har lcarncd to  rcad a mnp sincc, nnd is n rcry good Stnff OlIIccr now, but i t  rcall: 
did strike mc n t  the time ns bcing r c ~  odd. It mizlit amuse you to know how I 
oucc saw a Wnr Game I dincd with the Orcniclcrs of tlic 
Guard at eix o’clock, raticr a longdiuiier, ond r good dcal of tobaccoas  consumed 
afteraards. When I left nt about nine o’clock, I RIJ amazed at eeeing tho War 
Game had bccn produced, and I was told tha t  tlic Sublterns of tho regiment nncl 
one of tlie scnior O5cer3 nmuscd thcmsclws in that way after 3 nt her long iiicu 
dinncr once or t r i c o  o I do not hnow whit the Ofliccr~ of our regulars 
nould think nbout that, but I can hardly bclicve it being a oer j  auccesjful study 
undcr suck circumatsnccs. I n  conclusion, I will ndd that if nngonc COmC3 to 
Rcjtiiiinstcr Tom Jrnll, x o  shall bo rcry glad to show them what IVI) can nbout 
tho War Oamc. . 
Gcncnl Sir RODIX~T SIcxrE: I think there is not the rliglitc.it doubt thnt the 
Wur Oamc i3 of the grcatcst use, rspcciallp, XE the lccturcr has Enid, to  the 05ccrs  
lnjcd in Ilrcsdcn. 
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so T ~ E  PRACTICAL VALUE OF THE TAR a m E .  
r,f roluntccrs, and tliosc who Fcrrc o t  homc; but  tho W n r  Gamc ns p!ajcd n t  
I do not know if it  has 
Cwii  in nny way ntlqitcd to thc study of wnr3 S U C ~ I  a3 wo arc usunllj cngngcd in. 
Wlint I mcan is whctlicr it. would bo possiblc to conipilc a W n r  Game tlint woiild 
L.c npp]icablc to Fomc of the circiimrtnnccs in which me English prnctirnllj find 
oiirsclrcs wlim cng3gnrcl in non-Europcnn = m a .  It would ccrtninly, to mT niind, bc 
n rrry uwf~i l  thing if nnjthing of tho sort could bc draivn oiit tlint would bc nt all 
jpplicnblc to tlic circiinihmccs which \rc pmcticnlly hare to clcnl with; for I 
imnginc tfint liowcrcr niucli wc may lcnrn a3 to tlic pro c r  way of Icading troops in 
Inriy Eiiroilcan contcsts m c ~ i  us wc rcn(1 of in t ~ i c  booL of t:ictic3 t ~ i n t  v-c stuclj, 
p t i c u l n r l y  tlic Gcrmnn books, still tliosc nro circumrtnncrs with which wo mny 
iicrcr hare to dml, nncl FO 1 think i t  \roiild be a rcq- good thing. nnd I elioultl 
think that Qcncrd JIoncricff robnbly might nrsist in carr ing out tlic i d m  I wish 
to piit forwnrcl, to  ~ i n r c  somc+ling in t ~ i c  slinpc of a T a r  E m i c  w ~ i i c ~ i  woiild bo of 
~iracticnl IIFC to u s  in our crcrjdny fighting-mould bc of niorc iirc to  UJ ns roldicrs 
and to tlic joungcr Ofliccra than the  prcrcnt Wnr  Gnmc, uscful ns i t  is. 
Coloncl ~ I J C R I C E :  1 think I may rcnturo to  tny that it sccms t o  mc tha t  if thc 
Iirirgsrpicl mill girc us, us i t  undoubtcdly doc3,tlic Iiabit of follo~ring morcmctits of 
troops tipon Found,  nnd following the morcnicnts of troops upon maps, niid bring 
tliosc two in rclntion to  onc anothcr, thnt R O U I ~  bc cqunllj npplicnblc to our siiinll 
wars ns to  Continciitnl warfarc, und t h n t  ns it hspp.113 tlic rclntion of maps to  
ground bccomcs pnrticularly i m p r t n n t  in  rcfcrcncc to our  siiiall ~ a r 3 ,  kcaiirc 
u j u a l l ~  we h a m  to iiinko our maps crprcsalj for thcm, nnd thua i t  bccoincs 
cstrcniclp important tliat wc should bcconio ire11 acquainted with tlic rclntion WIiicIi 
the maps nctunllj bcar to pound, and sliould apply to  tliclu sucli eorrcctioiis 09 
cxpcricncc tcnchn us arc  ncccsrary. Tlic rcry bcst point conncctcd with tlic War 
Gnmc iccnis to bc this, thnt  n man who is working one of tbc eidca with n nunibcr 
of subordicatcs rindcr him sccs nnd fcels for liinirclf tho din;culty of issiiin,n IL  r c t  
of o d c r s  so conatructed that irlicn tlicy get to his subordinatce thcr shall be so 
clcir that  his subordinatcs shnll know csactly what hc intcnds thcm to do under nll 
circumrtnnccs nhicli may occur, nnd yct  elinll not FO tic tlicni 0.9 to  prcrcnt tlicm 
from crcrcising tlicir discrction ivlicrc tlicir diacrction ought to bc used. Tho W n r  
Gnme, if properly cnrried out, mnkcs a mnn think for hiursclf. IVc Imrii. a3 I Iiare 
said, front our  own iiiistakcs, and nlio from tlic nnnoyancc and irritation which 
constantly attcnd one in sccing sulorfinntm cnrry out,in quitr n ili5crciit way froin 
what had bccn intcnclcd, such ordcrs ns 1 l A r C  bccn issued. pmcficc ti rccciringniid 
issuing orders, 8 0  thnt they get to bc rightly intcrprctcd, is ccrtniril~ a n  cxpcricnce 
which is ns npplicnble to  our  mall wars as to  any Continental wars, nnd i t  connccts 
itself with that kind of training for military opcntions, learning to play onc'n own 
],art in n largo wholc, whicli is nftcr nll the most importnnt clcmcnt coiinccted with 
inodcrn war ; and wliicli would bo npplicnble to  our small wnrs ns ac l l  ns to Con- 
tinental mrfnrc. I do not  mjsclf scc how i t  would bo possible, with tho clnss of 
small aximpnips RC liarc usunlly, to get a n  nrcn of ground FO limitcd as to ninke 
nn1 actual figllting convcnicntly apply, o r  to  construct r n q n  that  would bc nvailnblc 
for tlic purporc of our rmnll wars. for this rcnron, that  in nlmost crcry sqximtc 
cnmpnjp in wliich RC nrc engaged thcrc nrc corditions distinct from crcry otlicr 
cnwpaigu. It thcrcforc appcnrs to  me tha t  you would gct much morc raluc uut of 
thc gamc if you nrc nblc to  compnrc thc wnrs of trliicli TTC liarc tho fullcrt nnd most 
coniplcto nccounts on thc Continent, with tlic cspcricncc of tho K r i c p p i c l  in 
relntioii to  moring troops, tlmn you would from tho accounts tlint wc nrc nblo t o  
girc of our smnll wnrs. In conclusion, I h o p  that Captain Spciircr \\"ilkinson's 
lccturc will attract nttcntion gcncrally to the  most ndmir~blo history of tlic'Kric-gs- 
spcil with mliich hc liaa iupplicd us in  onc of tho Manchcstcr Tnctic:il Soricty's 
papcn, nncl I may stat0 g c p c n l l j  tlint tlic body of pnpcrs publirlicd by tlic 
Yanchcster Tnctiml 86ciet j  ILTO such as, I tliink, any Officcr in the rooiii woiilcl bo 
dcliglitcd to  rmd, ind I nm iuro r c q  p r n t  'credit is duo to tlicm for tlic work tlicr 
Iiaw EO donc. 1 cnn only for mjrclf spcnk of the instruction vhich I h r c  got 
from Captaiii \\'ilkinson, froni tho knowlcdgc which lie bas of Gcrmnn work niici 
Gcnnnn cspcricncc, not only in rclation to  that pnrticulnr liijtorg of his. but  alto to 
othcr mattcrs, such ns thc  continual npplication which h c  lias bccn able t o  girc for 
rcscnt, I imaRiiic, ir only nppliotblo to Europcnii wnrz. 
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niinibcr of !car3 to following lip What 113s bccn donc in Continrntnl nrinics, tllo 
s t u c l ~  of diicli mnst bo rcq- raluablc to .any Officcr a110 follows it  up. I t  is also 
ollc of tho instances of tho pc3t  nssi3tanco that r o  gct from ~oliintccrs tliat p c  
shOil]d rcccirc siicli a nper from ono of thcmsclrcs as wc hare head to-day. 
nrr. C o r r m s ,  Xorglk Rifle Toliintccrj : l l icro ia on1 one obxrration I ahb 
to bc nllo\vctl to .makc, nnd that is with rcfercnco 10 the dkcult.y, which lins bwn 
,&ncd to hy one of tlic spcakcn, of rcading inaps. I consiclcr i t  a pnrticular1y 
clifl;cult opmtion, cspccially to ionic pcoplc. nnd i t  rcqiiircr R ccrtain amount of 
csprricncc in it bcforo ono can nppro~cli tlic groiind propcrly with a map in one's 
IlnnL1. I think nc arc losing nn opportunity pmcticnlly nffordrd by thc manocurrps 
comicd out nniong roluntccr rcgimcnts, alicn tlic Ollicers nrc not ns a rulc supplicL1 
Tit11 mapc, PO ( l int  tlicy can ctlucatc tltcrusclrcj no to  tlicir iisc ripon thoso occmions: 
I know that sotiic of 11s t3kc out S C K I p i  of thc Ordnnncc Sbcctr, and try to pick our 
m~- nbout with it, and make out n i  trcll n i  wc a n  tlic opcntioni that nro being 
a & d  out ; but if tho War Ollicc would irsiic maps on thin lincn or paper, ni I 
&liere they do to field Ollicek, to c rc r j  Captain, and pcrliaps to ercv Subaltcm 
Cngngcd in tho manacurrc~, it would bc 3 rcry great nssistnnco to tlicm in niastcrhg 
thc subjcct. 
Colonel LOSSDALE HALE : I o w ,  Sir, somo nplozy  to my friend Captain Spcnscr 
~~i lk inso i i ,  on privatc nnd pcnonal ground$, for my not Iiaring bccn pruscrit a t  tlic 
reading of his Iccturc, but iny ubscticc wns unnroidnblu. Tlic Icctitrc, PO far n i  I 
rend it,  thrO$vs nn nmount of li,nlit upon Kr icppic l  genrr.illy wliicli wc Lad not 
nrnilablc bcforc, and gircs us nuotlicr r i m  of tlic way in which Kricgsspicl may bo 
an(Iuctcd. l‘hcrc nrc, liowcrcr, man)- any3 in which liricgspicl n ~ n j  bc conductcd, 
of them Iiaring tlicir own particular mcrit, nnd I cannot Lclp thinking t h t  the 
way in which \re cotidiict Kriegsspicl in this district nndin tho south 1133 ndrnntapj 
qun l  to tliosc which nrc Iicld up ns so ciccllcnt by Captain Wilkinson. I do not 
jntcntl to dctain IOU long on tlic present occnsion, but the fact ij, my friend Cnptnin 
Spcnscr JVilkinson unknowingly mndc nn nttnct upon me clscrrlicro in conncction 
with liricgrspiel, Tit11 tlic onlj  result that I had tho plcnsiiro of nunibcring n frcsli 
113mc ntnong n i j  fricntls, niid tlint in this rniio lccturc Iic lins nintlc nuotlicr nttnck 
011 mc, probably also unknowingly, nncl this con1 CIS iiie to rcply to  soinc of his 
remarks. 1 nni pcrfcctly rrilling to ncccpt ~ i i s  onLiig~it ,  nntl iiicct i t  to thc best of 
niy porvcr. Cnptqin \Yilkinson 1139 publislicrl n niost csccllch ‘pnmphlct, cn t i t ld  
“I:ssays on tlie Wnr Qamc,” thcp arc rcr.7 diffcretit indccd from tlic lcctmr, 
kcnuso in thc cseays ho sliowcd us Iiow tlic Iiricgsspicl ouxht, in his opinion,’to bc 
conductd, nnd hc liaj not quito cntcrnl upon tbc samc dctailr thi3 crcninm. In  
tlint pnmplilct ~ i c  fountl fault r i t l i  certain ways in whicli a prticulnr cxerciZc lind 
bccn condrictccl 31 rrprdr tho fnmingof the “idca~1)’nnd to-daj he 113s to nccrlain 
cstcnt gone nt our otlicial rulcs for tlic conduct of tho Wnr Clniiic,wliicli wcrc issucd 
in 16%. In tlic prcfacc, or in tho rcfatorj rcinnrks, 111y nntnc OCCIIIY, incntioncd 
in far too camplimcntar~. Ian~ungc, But I hnd nothing wlintcvcr to do with dmwing 
lip tlicrc “Rulcs of tlic Wnr Gnmo ;I’ but tlic Conimittrc thought it fit to  summon 
inc orcr to Aldcrrhot to  conduct an cscrcisc in thcir prcscncc, wliicli I did. Tlio 
resiilt r a y ,  tltat. thc Committcc embodid in tlicsa rulcd a rcr lirgc numbcr of my 
o m  raggcrtions, many of which I rccognirc. Wcll, I r o i i d  liar0 \rillin& gircn 
rip crcq singlo ruggetion which they did embody if thcy only embodid, ns they 
liarc done, one in particular. nnd tliat r a g ,  “Rcfcrcnco to loss tablrr should bc 
rroidcd ns much ns possiblc, thc tactic31 situation bcing tlic busis of tho umpirc’s 
dccision.” n ’ o ~ ,  I would liar0 gircn up crcrjthing no long a3 they inscrtd that 
onc pnrticiilnr rcconin~cndation, nnd of thnt 1 1 1 j  friend Captain IVilkinaon aritcs 
ne follows:-“Tliis eccnis to mo to contain nn ndmksion inconsijtcnt with nny liigli 
cstiinntc of tlic r d u c  of tho book in which it nppem ;” that is t o  F~F,  110 thinks tho 
I w k  worth nothing rcry mricli, bccnuw my articular rcconimcndation is in it. 
That rccommcndation is just‘tlio wholo principfc upon which wo carry out Kricgs. 
*pic1 in IIIL district. wc dcclino to go into this question of loasc3 wjich, 60 fnr n3 
I understand Cnptain JVilLinwn’n lccturc, is tho rcry bnsis of tho Qcrmnn 
“Rcgimcntnl \‘Far Gamc,” nnd of 3fcckcl’s ejstem. Ercqtliing in that excrcix 
dcpnds upon tbe dmtructiro r c r  wliicli is nrsignd to the n.cqrnns itscd in thnt 
esercisc, nnd 11131 i3  onc of t c wost purclp coiirentional eitiniatcs that could 
YOL. XSXII. G 
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82 TIIE PR.\CTIC.\L VALUE OF THE Ki\R C.XJIE. 
por&ly Ec clmnn up. IIc tell, us that  somo Gcrnian Oficcr wcnt tlirougl~ 
rcgimcntnl hiitorics, nnd found out a h a t  tho cffcct of shots w r o  at  thc dillirciit 
ranges. Colonel P o d  Mcthucn nnd I harc bccn through n good many of thcsc, nnd 
ITC skould, I am siirc, haro to  look fa r  into thcm to find anjthing rhntcrcr to 
throw light upon the subjcct. IVhcrc on cnrtli Licutcnant Xauniann got tlic iiolion 
03 to thc nmorint of cartridgcs fircd, ond the cffcct of diffcrcnt shots a t  diffcrcnt 
ran cq, is simply incsplicnblc, nnd I do not bclicrc in its rcliability for onc momcnt. 
UC’L simply t~nm up somc ayctcm of orcrqcs, and jou may give n system of 
nrpnjics for crcrjtliing ; but it i9 purr17 and cntircly eonrentional. Tlic wholo ezcnco 
of this eubjcct i 3  that 1110 carryin,“ out of tho cscrciscr dcpcnd~ upon tho losscs. 
Tllosc of u9 xrho uscd t o  work a t  Krhsepiel mnny j c m  ogo will rcnicinbcr what 
that sort of loss bu:-incs3 waj, c‘rentuofly rcsulting, aftcr prolonged colculntion, in 
the l o ~ s  of half n man, or soinctliing of tliot kind. 1 do not undcrstond tlicse tablcs 
mhich 3p cnr in Cn tain Wilkinson’s “Es~ojson tlic %‘or Glamc,” but I ECC hnlf n 
man is alfoacd for tiosc n t  sonic nngcs, and tlic qucstion ir, is i t  worth w ~ c  to go 
into all theso thin,os in carrj-ins on Kricgsspiel? *It is not tho rim of.Colonc1 
Xcthucn, Coloncl Coopcr King, Ccncrd Moncricff, Coloncl Stirling, mjrclf, or of 
otlicrs, with re a d  to mrrjing out tho War Game; it L not mcrcly our oirn 
donmatic idcn t in t  wc can do without thcso losscs, but wc harc on o w  sidc tho 
mftcr of this littlc book I hold in my hand, Tcrdr du Tcrnoir. His sjstcm of 
Kricgsspicl igiiorci oltogcthcr lo~sccs. ‘I’hcro is no grcntcr namc in Germany, with 
regard cithcr to thcsc crcrcircs or tactical cscrcirs gc3cnlly, and thcrcfow tho nnmo 
undcr which w o  rhcltcr oursclrcs, if RC wnnt to do to, i3 sufficicnt ; OIII-F xrc ado t 
v. du \‘crnois* sjstcm 0s n mattcr of cotuiiion scnsc, nnd morc applicable to tEo 
English Army. acncrd  Ycrdy du Vcrnois sprslia, in thc prcfacc to his hook, wliicli 
1138 bccn tmndatcd by Major Moedonald, in this nay. H c  i3 r caLing about tlicso 
rulcs nnd the usc of t h o  dicc ond tables of lorws : “ rt i 3  indccb)o& h Ecrcro toil 
nnd n grmt cspcnditurc of time thnt nny one r l i o  has not Icnrncci t l o  gamo by 
actunl )ncticc cm, througii nna:sistd study of tho books of iiistruction, ;o
thoroughy master thc subject as to bc compctcnt to conduct tlic conduct of an 
cscrciso of this kind. So it comcj obout tlint tlicrc arc assuredly in tho smallcr 
garrisons many Oniccrs a h o  sliould bc ctpcciallj fitlcd from tlicir position to tako 
tho matter in Iinnd, who utterly ahrink froin doing 60;’’ ond it is this tcrriblj 
monotonous work in mrrjing out um irin,q n t  Krirgsspicl tlinf hos kcpt so many 
Officcrs of tlic Iiiglicr nnks  frON unicrtnting that work. ca icy haro not lookccl 
upon it rimply a8 n tncticd crcrcisc, but n gnnio carrjing with it a grcat nuinbcr of 
rule3 ond calculations. “ I in no \ray undcrntc the rcrricc ~diiclr tho rcccnt hooks of 
instruction, with thcir rulcr, thcir dicc, and tlicir tablo of losses liar0 rcndcrcd, ond 
will rcndcr in tho fnturc. It consists chiefly in this, that thc umpirc find3 in tho 
rulcs Iiscd principles b r  wliicli to limit tho cnpacity nnd lighting porcr  of troop, 
and dctine that tlic effcctirc use of wca ons gains full crcdit by mmns of tlic tnblcs 
of lorscs, and tlrnt dicc, wliicli gircs to cyianco its duc inn iiciicc, proridc nn apparcnt 
cccurity npinst  pnrlinlity in the decisions. The qucstion, Iiomrcr, arisci irhctlicr 
tho g m c  might not bo mndc crcn morc iucful thnn i t  is if tlio clilllculty of csccution 
and thc cspnditurc of timo aliich tho crcr mcchmical divisions inrolrc could b? 
aroidcd.” That wc nll wantcd to do when wc began to umpirc; we wanted to gcL 
rid of 011 this drcnry monotony. “Erpcricncc shows that this qucstion can bc 
nnsreml in tlie affirmntirc.” And tlicn he proccdr to spcak of tlic instructire 
excursions which arc car r id  on orcr tho  country by ccrtnin Officcr~ of n garrison, 
just tho snmc ns tliorc who work n Iiricpsspicl. ‘I It 113s ncrcr bccn foui~d,” IIC ~ays, 
“ncdfu l  in tlicsc cscor.iions to  rcttlo tlic rcquisitc dccisions by tho chancc of dice, 
tho umpirc g i r c ~  it according to his o m  ricws; ncithcr is it  thought ncccrsnr3 to 
inrcstigntc in tlic closcst detail thc cffcct of irmpons. It is found rufficicnt to 
arrirc u t  tho gCnCnl conclwion that onc body has suffcrcd ccrtnin scrcrc losscs, or 
that i t  has bccn SO slakcn th?t its ffmhting pomr  is rubstantidly wealcncd, ond 
rhcthcr on thc ~vliolo i t  is in n cond&n to continuo to odvoncc under thc cncmj’e 
fire, or to innintain it3 position,” and thcrcforc, at onc fcll siroop, Clcnenl Tcrdg 
du Vcrnois ewccps nway all this calculation of loszc3. And thcn lie goci on to  say 
Sou may cnrry on Kricpspiclo3 JOU likc ; sou may iisc smdl maps or IOU may 
takc Mcckcl’s sp tcm and usc your tablcs,” but lie tap, “ Sou can 0150 u3c m r  nay, 
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THE PRACTIUAL VALTJX OF THE WAR GIIIE. 
which is tho idertical way thnt Colonel Yethucn, Colonel Cooper King, General 
yoncrieff, Colonel Stirling, ond mysclf hare bccn conductin for a long timc. IVe 
llnre simply, without perhape knowing it, bccn follomng Vc$ du  Vernois’ mcthod, 
which mafcs Kricgaspiel far less wcarkome nnd f= moro accoptablc to  the 
British O5ccr than it wn8 when sou lind got all these cnlcnlntions to  c a q  out. I 
od-y hope that in the coiirse of this discuesion Porno of thoao who horo taken part 
in Kricppief 611 bring out somo of the difficultics wo mect with in mrrjin- i t  on, 
dificulties connected wit11 cavalry scouting nud eo forth, Eo tlnt Captain s’,cnscr 
TVilkineon will Lw nblc to tell 11s in his rcply how thcw dimcultics nro bcst dealt 
with. 
Colonel XITHEEX : f,fccl n t h e r  liko one of tho gcntlcmcn in tho t r i a n y k r  ducl 
in 6‘ Yiddiipmin Eos bcwuso Colonel Hnlo is a nrticular friend of mine. nnd so 
iscaptain Wi1kinron.h I n m  forced to dirngrcc. ?think that Coloncl IInle’s nttnck 
ia B little unfair, bccnuro I understnnd Onptnin Wilkinson to ED that when you 
hnro n mnn who cnn do tho work of the unipiro in tbo m y  that 6oloncl IInle can 
do it, with n light heart, thcn by al l  mcnns adopt tho wny Colonel IInle proposcs. 
Captain Wilhinsan says it is not o~cg-whero you can find a man who cau nct as 
nmpirc, and in that cuo you must fall back on tho hard nnd fast rulcs. I hnre 
had tho good luck to  ece Colonel I I n l o  Torking, nnd hiring dono m~ bcst to 
imitate him I find it most wcnrisomo to conduct tho Wnr Gnme ns wrricd out in 
the ray Coloncl lIa10 has found fnult with. It ia oxtremelj di5cult to ulnpirc at 
any time, so as to mako tho pmo go smoothly. For instance, take tho carolry 
rcdcttcs, unlcsa you eoy to both side3 nt oncc, “ You recollect that n cainlry rcdcl to 
may hare 600 yards circlc round him, and sco nll thnt hc can over in that 
800 jard3.” One sarcs a rnst amount of timo nnd disputing ns to what o r d e t t o  
Can eec and whnt hc cannot. ecc by this sjstcm OE umpiriinpn. Thcn nnothcr thing 
is thia, I think thnt tho nssistnnt umpires r c q u k  imlncnsc instruction. I find sn 
nesiatant umpirccomcs to mo nnd says, ‘ I  I shall bo most gkd to nssist you in c r c q  
nay, but this is tho first timo I h a ~ o  dono anything of tho kind.” That is to mc 
absolutely hopelcss. n n t ,  I think, should bo dono in theso pmcs is thnt thc 
mistant um ire should mcet tho umpirc, 6aj, nn hour bcforo tho plajcrs comc 
together, n n i  you should moro tho troops on both eidcs forward, Ict me say thirty 
or fort minutcs, till they como into contact, nnd then let tho plnyers commcncc. 
I my& hare done thnt, and h x o  found it sarcs a great nmount of time. Thcn 
thero is nnothcr thing I find, nhich is this, that you girc a Dirision to peoplc 
who would ncrcr probably commnnd moro than a bnttnlion. I think thaL is a 
mistake. M y  idco of Kricgsspicl is to  giro o man nho is likclj to command a bnt- 
talion or a brigade, a b r i d e  command. It is no uscgiring him a Dirision or an Army 
Corpe. I n  Berlin the h i sc r ’ a  Fmnz Guard Rcgiment play week nftcr ncck their 
War Games. \To used to play tho Wnr Gamo nnd hato sup e r  afterwards, nnd n 
friendlr game i t  was; but if I remcmbcr right, thoy rroricd their I<ric,o?~piel 
with fnr smaller numbers tlinn n o  hnro sccn it workcd hcre. I n c n t  to Xnnchcstcr 
lost year, nnd Ican speak, as others bnro spoken, of tho immcnne good that thc Jfnn- 
chr tc r  Tnctical Socicty haro done, the immenso intcrcst thcy tnkc, and tlic 
immcnso nmount wc haro lcnrnt from tho most excellent pnmphlcts \rhich ham 
cmnnoted from thnt Socicty. 
General MOSC~IEFF: I will not detain you R minuto. I only wantcd to mm-  
tion thnt Lieutenant Sharpc, of tho 3rd JLiddlcscx Toiuntccr Rcgiincnt, has pub- 
liehcd n most excellent set of mapg, rcry clmrly d r a m  and colourd. Of course, 
nlthough, ns tho lccturcr 3% 8, it is of tho gmtcs t  importanco to haro ma 3 of an 
octunl picco of country, sti6 thcrc is no doubt that nhcn you h r o  workcrf battles 
otcr thia ieco of country for a considcrablo timc, you sometimca rather want a 
chnngc. %cutenant Shnrpo hns i n rcn td  a set of mops, so constructed that IOU 
em put nny map in nnr possible fpaition on tho entiro squro  plnn. Each section 
has rooda running outbn cncs si e at the sumo interrals. Inone  position a little 
bit of a rond m y  only end in a fnrmhoese, in nnothcr position it mny run right 
though the map’; tho consequence is you ‘an r n v  your ground, nnd thc umpirc 
simply has to  scud 6 t h  the little sketch plnn of the p m c  that ho has decided 
upon, the order in which ho wishes the rections of tho mn to bo phccd. Thcsc 
iuape should be pnrticuhly useful for militia or Foluntcer gattnlions, wko cannot 
a!! 
88 
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81 TIIE PR.\CTICAL VALUE OF T I E  WAR G.\3IE. 
nfford to buy map3 of rarious picco of country; if t h y .  buy Lieutenant Sliarpc's 
cct, tllcr harc nuactual piccc of country to atart vitli, nnd can xirx it indcfinitcly. 
Tlicrc IS 0160 a considcrable sizcil rircr, wliich can bc put bctwcn any linc of 
srction,, or nt tlic top, bottom, or sides of the mnp.I 
Coloncl LOSSDALE HALE :Allcw mc to Fa1 onc R O ~  mith rrprd to  r l i a t  Coloncl 
3lctl111rn said just now. I nm mthcr tired nbwit licaring v h a t  1x1s bccn raid nbout 
niy umpirinf n t  Kriegjspicl. l'hc difficulty of finding an utnpire i 3  simply owing to 
tlic fact that, Ollirrr3 will not look upon it nr a tacticnl cscrcisc. XOR I do 
innintnin tlicorctically that nny single ficld Officer in thc rcrricc r h o  might bc 
C J I ~ C ~  ont n t  L\ldcrsliot to-morrow to takc command of a smnll forcc of tlic tlircc 
army, if ho is fit for tlint duty, can rcry xcll, with tho nid pcrbap  of a little help 
in map rcading, takc clinrgc nnd umpirc nt nn cscrcisc n t  Kricgsspicl. 
Captain SrEssEn \VJLK~SSOS: I must confcrs I nni u 1itt1c ajtonishcJ a t  i l i a t  
Coloncl IIalc 112s said, bccausc I thought I l i d  trinl to conrcy. r i t l i  rcgnrd to tlic 
Englitli rulcs, that iE tlicsc rules werc folloscd, the cffcct oE fircarms nodd liarc 
very little influrncc on t!x rcsult. Wicy nljo contnincd thc stntcmcnt of rliich 
Coloncl 11310 claims thc nidhorship, that " Itefcrcncc to tho 1053 table3 shoiiltl bc 
'nroidcd as niucli as possible, tlic tactical situation being the basis of tho uuqiirc'a 
decision." Thi t  qqicnrcd to mc to bc pcrfcctly rialit, nnd I say that rhcn you 
nxiko that statcmcnt, it  would sccni to dcstroy tho raluc of tho rcst of rour book, 
with its tablcs of loaac~ and its othcr ccrice of tabIc3. \\.listis tho use of publirliing 
a book 6 t h  tlic old stylc of rulcr, and thcn saying in yonr book tbnt you do not 
W U I ~  to UFC tI:cm? I think it would harc bccn o grcat d c d  bcttcr if Coloncl 
Ilnlc's part of thc book liad bccn rctnincrl, nnd thc rest Iiad bccn abolislicd. 
Colonel Unlc asts mlicrc nrc thc rcgimcnts from \vliich Captain Knumann took 
lrir f iprcs? Tiicrc i3 no difficulty in nnjwcring tlic qiicition. I will, if Lc 
wishcj, rc3d thc xholc list. With regard to nny liidoric fact, cspccinlly with 
regard to war, wlicrc is tlicrc any singlc fact a t  all for rliich you liavc nnF- 
tliiiig cxccpt doubtful information, and for rrIiicIi you h r c  certain tc3tiniony ? 
I supporc nothing is morc ditlicult than to nsccrtain nctimlly d i n t  tlic effect 
of f imrnu  1133 brcn in shaping 0n.v particular brrttlc3, and tlicrc I quitc ngrrc 
with Coloncl Ualc ; but, at  tLc mnic timc, I ahall be rcry mucli astonislictl if 
Coloncl Unlc do0 not say that tlic nest timc wc go to war, fircarmr will dccidc tlic 
b:ittles o w  way or tlic othcr, and that tlic r c d t  mill tlepcnd not only upon tlic 
twining of t l ~ c  troops, but nlso on the process by ~~ l i i c l i  t ic O5lccr prcparcs hiin- 
sclf to train troops, and trics to fmmc in his mind 3 ccrtain numbcr of principlca 
0 1 1  whicl1 IIC nftcrnarda proposcs to act. It sccnis to  mc tlic chicf fiictor rill bc 
tlic Ofircr's ricn n3 to the cfScct of modern .fircams, nnd that Iic r i l l  try to gct 
SOIIIC idfa ns to what tlic effect of fircarms will bc. If you will allow me to put  it 
for n mcr.cnt in n sort of pcrsonnl ray, I ~lioiild ~ s y  if I h n c  5 conipny, nnd if I 
nnl p i n g  to takc my conipnny into D sham fight, my first businej~ is to say to 
ti~rsclf m11cn I are nn enem)--, "Sopyosing t h o  pcoplc mcrc firing bullcts, w h r c  
~ s i ~ l d  thosc bullcts go, ant1 nka t  shou d I do lo get my men outof tlicir nay until 
IIIJ cornpnny is wanted ? " I cm only harc n notion of that by horinp thouglit n 
~ m l  dcd  about tlic use nnd cffcct of fircnmi?, not mcrclj what you gct in tho old- 
fnsliioned I ~ c d  nook3 nbout tnjcctory. but ns rcgards the cff'cct of a large numbcr 
of riflcs bcing fircd in 3 particular dircction. Wit11 rcfcrcncc to the surhcc of tlic 
ground, thc qiir3tionl nbout thc cffcct of thc fl rc nppcar to mc to bc cnormouslj 
important, nnd one of the principal thing3 which tlic infantry Offircr has to  lcnrn 
i3 thc rca1 cffcct of firearms. I n  what tvay is tliis to bc lcnrnt u111css .IS far ns you 
can JOU go back to  thc history of prcrioui ba t t lc~?  M y  RliOlC rontcntion is that if 
JOII can get Coloncl 1I:ilc to unipirc, you do not rnn t  any book or nny thcorr nt 
1 Tllc cost of tlicjc I' Intc&hangcnblc \iTm Qamc Xap " is a3 follotrs :- 
.. f 3 3s. 
€1 l r .  
3 coniplctc niaps, on millboard, colourcd nnd rnrnishcd 
2 boxcr blocks (rcd nnd blue) with four ScnlC3 and dividers.. 
dddrcss : T h t c n a n t  S. Sharp, 3rd 3Iiddlc:cs RiOc Volnntccrs, Thc Crow, 
nnnipstcad, X.W. 
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THE PR.\CTICA.L VALUE OF THE IY-iR G.\31E. 85 
all. I n  our onn Tncticnl Socicty, when \rc knrc bccn so fortunntc 3) ( 0  p, 
u~~~pi rc s -~ i id  I m y  cny u c  linrc bccn fortunatc once or tnicc ; on oiic occnrion 
Colonel Urackeiibury liimirlf \\us good cnough to unipirc for IIS-NC ccrtainlg did 
my nn) thiug to liini about firc scnlclcs, wc wcrc only too delightctl if lie woultl 
urnpin? for us in  nny way I10 likcd, and wo would bc dcliglitcd if Coloncl ]I& 
do tlic rnmc. But if Coloncl Ilnlc aays that nny rolunteer Olliccr is 10 
Ilmpirc, and Ought to  bc nblo to  umpirc, aitliout mcchanicnl aid3, I join issue wit11 
him. Y c r ~  fCR roluntccr Of f i~cn  aro qudificd, and, as far ns my obscrration goes, 
nothing ir so disn9troua ns roluntccr OUiccrs professinn to do i t  when tlicy annot.  
%’hat I hnrc t r i d  to put forward is that so long ns it i g  n mcro qncstion of rulc9, 
rliicli can bc aorkcd out by mnchincry, nnd 1 h a w  sccn IYar Onmcs plnycd in 
tl1.t way comc out rcry acll  ; aa long na it  mas nicrc rulcs, you did not r a n t  nn 
umpirc; but akcn  i t  is mnnacuTrcs on n map 1011 must harp nn iimpirc rlioni 
crerybody trusts, wmo onc, liko Colonel &lo or Coloncl Drnckcnbury, somc Food 
umpire~hoso  word for roluntecn is enough. n u t  if it is one roluntccr in n 
mlment umpiring for the others, tho p lqcrs  will my, “Wo sliould lit0 to kilorv 
ally lie rants us to  retire. IIc had bcttcr find a recrwn.” Tlint is my own pnc. 
ti-1 cxpcriencc, and whcn I look a t  tlic Iiietov of tho gnmc, I F ~ J  tlmt is tllc 
CJpricncc of tlic gnnio in gcncnl. With rcgard to h’aummn’e scale. Coloncl IIdc 
says hc docs not uriderst-tsnd it. Tlint ia probably my fault, but, I think, when ne 
come to tho Kriegsspicl, a t  d i i c l i  110 i5 going to umpirc, I shall bc nblc to m n L c  
him pcrfcctly well undcrrtand h’numnnn’s scalc, and, I think, nng Olliccr Rho FeCJ 
it will agrcc that it is n urcful thing to  D pcrson r h o  is not an authority. J‘erdy 
JU Vcrnoia cnjs, ‘I I w i l l  in no wny rcfusc to rccognizc tlie TPIUC of the old tricd 
guidcs to tho War Game, with their rulee, dice, and tablcs of losrcs. It consists 
&nly in this, that thc umpirc finds in tho rulcs Gxcd rcgulatioiis whicli giro tho 
limits of what tho diffcrcnt nrmics and tho differcnt troops can do.” That is 
eractly what 3 roluntccr Rants, eomo boundary linci fixing thc maximum nntl 
mininium of robablo losses. Tlint i3  tho objcct of what I hare callccl tlic 
meclianiccl niB, amonf uliicli t ~ i o  firc.scn~e i j  thc most vniuablc. Tlio uin irc 
must u p  to Iiinirclf, Tlic crcct of that firing is co nnd so on thosc men.” 1Ie cfoc, 
not iicceemril rny twcnty-fire men nro killcd or 11nlf-a.rnan i j  killcd, but Iic says, 
rn Captain lfvnlo enys, “Tliis firc undcr thesc conditions nil1 not producc sucli 
vrious 10s  ns to cniisc the cotnpnny to  retire,” or “Thc lorscs by firc arc so ccrious 
that tho company will rctirc in confusion;’’ but aurcly crcn Colonel IInlc’s dccision 
must be bnsed u I undcrsland tlint nny decision of nn umpiro is 
f w n d d  upon w g t  Iio hliercs mould bc thc e5ecr of thc Grc. All tlint we liarc 
to do is to try and Gnd something rl i ich r i l l  hclp thc roluntccr mlicro lie Gnds i t  
neccsasry to tr)- to umpire. 1 sliould l i tc to refer Colonel L[olc ton  compnntirely 
recent book on the \Ynr Gnmc, by Cnphin Uilimek, in wkich tlicrc is nn cssny 
called I C  Limits of Reckoning the ~~ossC3. ’ Colonrl Hilimck rnjs r h n t  IOU r n n t  is 
not to cilculato 11alf-a-nian or t no  men; tliew minutc lorscs nrc ouly wantcd 011 
very mro occasionr, and IOU may pncticnlly ignorc them, crcn though g i x n  ow 
Naumann’s rcnlc, but IOU do Rant romctliin,n to tcll you whctlicr the compnny 
under firc is sbnkcn or not. I know no 0 t h  way by which on OIficer in the pori- 
tion of most roluntccr Olliccrs cnn wttlc that, except by somo authoritative t JL  
or tale. Coloncl 3fetliucn mid, ‘I Why do JOU girc a man o Division P ”  Tho 
English mnp ie on n ecnlc of eis inclics to a mile. It ia not 3 smlc on aliicli you 
ean work out things in r c r j  grcnt dctail. In tho Xanchcstcr Tncticnl Socicty wo 
used a t  h t  to tnkc rcry smnll forcca, wc ncwr wcnt nborc n Lnttnlion, nnd ITC carried 
on tho cngagcment on tho six-inch map ; but tho moment IC cam0 to tkc dctail wc 
found it impracticnblc, bccau.0 thc mnp R ~ J  not on n large cnougli scale. I t  is con- 
rtantly tho case with s &-inch map, thnt IOU cannot rettlo enough dctnil to 
decide tho actual fighting of emnll bodies; nnd, thcrcrorc, ou nrc clriren to 
nwunco tho attempt to  go rcry minutely tlirougli thc nctunl figiting. h soon ns 
the detail of the tghting is nbnndoncd, the Inrgcr uuits ncquirc a far grcatcr 
interest t h n  tho smaller oncs. When you oncc get pmt icc  in munocurring, JOU 
very soon r n n t  to liar0 n ])irision, or two Division?, bccnurc thc dirisional coni- 
msndcr is tlic firit commandcr upwards in tlic smlc r h o  kns sumcicnt rcs onsibility 
and initiatirc to makc tkc phycr indcpendcnt. uorcorcr, it  is rcry IiarSto inrcut 
11 tlic losscr. 
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86 THE PRAOTICAL VALUE OF THE WAR QAUIE. 
nn idca for a wry  small body rhicli  slinll bo mtuial and likc something in war, 
and yet shall giro thc player n rcnl initiatirc. I ngrco with Colonel Mcthucn n3 
regards tlic nssigtant umpirc. W c  linro nlaays found it is not tho sliglitcst usc niiy 
man trying to be nasirtmt umpire unlcselio ha8 hnd a littlc practice; this work hna 
to bc Icnnt, or c l u  thc iimpiro cannot rely upon Irk nsirtants. I bclicro if Colonel 
Bnckcnbuq wcro to tcU tlic truth of what 110 saw n t  our Society h o  would $3). thc 
same thing. Coloncl Slnuricc alludccl to tho difficulty of composinn orders. It 
ECCm to mc that tho ructico in composing ordcn and writing tlicrn?, nlmort tlic 
gcatcst bciicIit thnt tEo H'nr Gamc girrs. Tho Officcr gcts an cno~nous  nmount 
of pncticc in mnking up Ilia mind, and rcry carefully cxpresing himself, so tliat 
tlrc subor~hnto is not too much ticd, and yet i e  likely r l icn occnrion a r k s  to  do 
thc right thing. I t h n h  you very much for the kind in which you 1nro 
listencd to me, and I can only npoloniro for tho r c r j  rough form of my Iccturc. 
Thc C ~ A I I L X A S :  \vc shall rill Ecartilj ngrco thnt wc h r c  not ody hnd an 
estrrnicly intcrciting lccturo but n raluablc discussion, which is esnctly tho object 
a h c d  nt. I t  ia not for mc to dcloin you after all tbat has bccn mid inuch bcttcr 
thnn I could say it, but thcrc nrc juat onc or two littlo points on wliicli 1 may aak 
to bc nllowcd to  my n word or two. Ocncnl Moncricff r e r j  wiscly touclicd upon 
thc poiiit that w o  Pnglisli do not takc life in quitc tho snmc wnj a1 tho Germans 
do. Xosr, I happcn to  li3TC iccn n w8r Gamo playcd in Bcrlin, nnd tho pnticnco 
displajcd 8 3 3 ,  ns thc (h tnnns  thcmdrcs  would my, simply colossnl. IVo could 
not mntcli it hcrc. On tlic first occiaion ahcn  I crcr conimnndcd a forco in n War 
Gamc, I rm gircn n wl~olo army corps, and my opponent had an  army corps o h .  
W o  w r c  placcd a long didnncc from each otbcr, Lc n t  Rcnding, I a t  AldcrAot, and 
tlic rcsult was that wo foirglit for a W C C ~ ,  and during that wcch I caunot en j  tlint I 
crer Iind n comfortablc night. GCnCdd are not T C C ~  much in tho habit of fighting 
for D wliolc acch in tho snmc bnttlc. Certainly I haro sccn opcrations which ~ Z T O  
lasted diirinji tlirco days of etcntly fighting, but crcn thcn thcy rlcpt at  night, wkicli 
wns iuorc thnn 1 was rapnblo of doin . Thnt was pcrhnpe olsing to want of 
paticnce. It hnppcned to  Inc during t f c  ISGG cnmpsign to 6cc n Saxon carahy 
rcgimcnt morc off to  tbc fight, and ns I npproaclictl them thcy had tho nppcamnco 
of nn cnormous bnse band. Whcn I got CIOM I found that c r c r ; ~  man had a long 
pipc in his. mouth, which lookcd like 8 musicnl instrument. It m a j  bc tllcio p i p  
that giro them tLc paticncc, but tho r c d t  ccrtninly is that tho Uerluan has. .n 
nmouiit of pnticncc which RO cannot imitntc. Theru sccma to bo a gcnenl ngnc- 
mcnt as to tho ruprcmc d u o  of tho IYnr Qnmr ns B mcaiis of tactical iustruction 
and pncticc, not only inrolring knoa-kdgc but all tho qualitica that mnkc 8 uian n 
good coldicr, probably tho snnio qunlitics which inako him n good crerjtliing cbc. 
He ncquircs linorlcdgo of pound, nnd of time nnd rpncc in n military oenlc, 
dcckion of cl~nncter, and n grcnt many otlicr militrrj faculties which n r e  raluablc, 
and which Iic lrns the opportunity of ercrciaing in tho Wnr Gamc. Cnptnin Spcnser 
Wikinson vns kind enough to I! enk of my going to Hnnchcstcr ; on which occtwion, 
b tlrc way, I wotc  bcforchnnc! to rcqucst tlint tho umpirc'r rcrdicts mi h t  be 
atsolutcly tnhcn ns Gnnl without any controrerg. I wns TC much struckgf the 
dccision, tho molncre, tho want of flurry in thc OEccn 30 plnjcd. h'obody 
scclncd tlic lcait nnxious ; tlicj ccr!ninly Emokcd cigars nnd pipca M tho Ocrinans do, 
and perhaps thnt has something to do with kceping thc ncrres steady; a t  an mte, 
thc 6tcndii:css wns lhcrc, and I can only suppose thut it wad brought nbout ty tho 
constant pmctico wlJch thc 3Innchcstcr Tuctical Society hnrc in tho Wnr Game, 
nnd in thc tnctic31 studicr rkicli  relato to  it. W e  dl ngrcc that the War Gnmo is 
spccinllr uacful as n m c a n ~  of ncquiring tactical koorlcdgc, and dcrcloping thosc 
rarious points of chnractcr which hnro bccn incntioncd. Dut somc Olliccrs f a n g  
that tho gamo is theorcticd, nnd thnt it docs not give ns much pnctirsl instruction 
in war ns tkcrc ought to bc. JYcll, you cannot Iinvo rcal war crcry sccond day for 
Officers to lcnru thcu duty, and nll t h c j  can do is to ct the ncarcst atbilublc 
approach to it. Tlic nmrcst nppronch of 311 will be founcf to bo tacticnl manmurreB 
on tho  field, and wlicn we caunot liar0 that, thcu tacticnl mnnmurrca on a map, 
\rliich also giro imrncnso pncticc in  tlint mojt uscful and nccc3sa knoalcdgc. thc 
rcading of maps. Yen must study nowadays, it is no iiw prctcn?& An Officer 
may bc an erccllcnt drill in tho bnmck qunrc, hc mnj  not gct his companj or 
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=giment or bnttalion, or whnterer it i9, clubbed or turned inside out, but ho is not 
therefore an Officer skilled in the morements of wnr ; hc may indeed know nothing 
&atorer nbout su& morcments, nnd yet be whnt is called “ n  rery good drill.” WO 
find t h t  all the best Qcncrals haro been students of war. It does not follow tht  
student is n p t  General, but I do not think nnybody can Le n first-rate soldier 
unless he is both n thoroughly prnctical mnn, n man of cliamcter, nnd n etndent m 
well. Xor is it the Qcnenl alone R ~ O  must study. The youngcst O5ccn  in these 
days hare to learn to be tncticinns-thero is no question nbout thnt. Then, no&, 
it  is not only-the \yar onme itsclf which is useful, but tho discussions to which 
every nmo pres nse. X c n  soy, ‘( So nnd so, d i n t  n fool he m d e  of himself"- 
t‘ KO, f e  did not.” Then a discussion arises nt once, nnd technical howledgo in 
thereby dcrclopcd. Certainly, this qucstion of nmpircs whicli hni been d~cussed 
is a rery interesting one, nnd I really do not see th3t then: is much differenco in 
opinion. It seems thnt the understanding between the gentlemcn R ~ O  hare spoken 
is thnt ns long ns there i3 somebody who ie n thorounhly good tactician, who u well 
acqunintcd with tho l fnr  Game, nnd in whom crerykd has contidenee, you do not 
want nny rule3 a t  nll. You any to him, “Judge, spcd, we al l  obey.” But when 
0 5 C C 1 3  nro plajinn nmong themsclres, they hare n littlo hesitation nbout lnpng 
d o m  the lnw to c3& othcr,nnd the msult L that  you rcquire some kind of rncamre- 
ment or ulculations to say Rh3t nro tho ~osscrr in n general way, and whether n 
company is l ih ly  to  hare suffercd 80 much that it unnot  go on with its work ns  
before. For thnt pwpoeo the simplest means that can bo found would naturally bo 
the best. Tho want of patiencc which exists nmong ourselrc~ certainly lcod3 us 
not to be nblo to work the Wnr Qame on quito tho snmo ehbonto SMIC thnt tho 
Qcrmnns do. At nny mtc, TO nnnt to 6eo something more lirely t h n  they do. W o  
l i t0 to haro the thin quicker, to  hare somcthingmoro for our money. In connection 
with this, I should d o  to call your attention to t h e n r r n p n c n t  which w38 inrented 
by Cnptnin \\‘ilkinson Shaw. When 110 RU n Garrison Instructor a t  Aldershot, he 
dceiped n most beautiful model of the country on n rcry hrgo scale. The pln ers 
were nt the different cornera of tho room with their maps; they plnjed on doso 
mapi, but thc nudienco wero looking at the model, and the assistant umpircs plnced 
pioccs on tho model shomng whnt wns bcin dono on tho ma s. It RWI w r y  much 
moro interesting nnd moro like r c l i t y  to t i e  spretntor3. Tf~o model being largo 
there wns Eot so mnch crowding round it, nnd altogether the spcctnclo RM more 
ririd nnd cnjopble. Thnt RIU n little inrention of our English om, nnd I do not 
seo wh7 we should dwnys in eregthing follow exactly what is done by other y p l e .  
There u n complaint, how far it may bo truo I do not h o w ,  but it in said t n t  RO 
do not take interest enough nowndays in m Z t a T  work. Certninlj, we tnko moro 
interest th in  we used to do, but, no doubt, KO mght take n littlo more, and I h o p  
wc shall do FO. Why is it thnt so littlo intcrcst is taken in militnry nffnirs? It 
must certninly bo bemuse TC, unlilrc the Continentnl mtions, bcliero thnt wm is far 
from us, nnd rery likely will nerer npproncli u9 ; that we shnll nercr hare to  do 
any fighting in the Continentnl s enso tha t  in to my, nono of us will orer hnro to 
opporo nn enemy who is n thoroughly skilled lender of troops. This is mther nn 
unfortnnnte thought if it leads us to  cnrelcssnees in militnry nffairs. ’Ihen, is D 
sort of principle we nu b o w ,  in which nnjtliing thnt in distant is forgotten, id not 
cared nbout. Xow, ire rcnd tho other dny thnt in China therc wns an accident; n 
rirer burst its banks, nnd by its orcrflow four millions of peoplo wcro dromed, nnd 
some two millions moro rendered howlers  and desolato. We do not think as much 
about that n d u l  utastropho 08 HO should if a Bishop wero Idled in (L rnilaay 
accident in England. It in nll rcr-v well to say, “Wo think nbout whnt concern 
ourselres; n c  nre not Chinese.” But  neither aro TO Bishops, nnd I do not know 
that my of us hcro aro r e 7  U e l  to be. X o  ; one nccident is fnr off, and the other 
ia ucnr. And wo think wnrjs [ I  off, nnd, therefore, 05cclv nllow themaclrcs to 
any, Id It \rill nerer be my chnnco to ham to lead this, that, and tho other; and why 
should I worry about the Wnr  Gnmc, or anything else?” Thnt is D rcry unfortunato 
s t a b  of mind to get into, and I hop0 it is one which we nro getting out of ne faet 
as RC can, for, in truth, may bo nenrer than ie genernlly supposcd. I haro now 
tho plcnsnnt ta3k of complimenting Captnin Wiltinson in your nnmo for tho moat 
n h r a b l o  nccount which ho hoJ giren UB of the commencement of the War Game, 
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its historj as it lias progrcsed, and its italc at tlic prcsent time in tho rnuntv 
d i i c l i  wc arc gcncnllj nccustomcd to consider tlic Icntling iiiilifnrj I’orer. He has 
clc~oted his timc iti IL most prnitc-orthy iiianner to tlic study of this qucstion, and 
L? ha, liindlj brought his wliolc h o r k d g c  to b c x  upon tlic lcctura nliicli Iic ha$ 
giren us, for which mc 311 return liini our gntcful t11inLs. 
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